Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies
Volume 13

Article 9

1-1-2004

Boys will be Girls: Sex Reassignment Surgery and the Ethics of
State Funding
Megan Leslie

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/djls

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative
Works 3.0 License.
Recommended Citation
Megan Leslie, "Boys will be Girls: Sex Reassignment Surgery and the Ethics of State Funding" (2004) 13
Dal J Leg Stud 239.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For
more information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca.

GIRLS WILL BE BOYS . . . 239

BOYS WILL BE GIRLS: SEX REASSIGNMENT
SURGERY AND THE ETHICS OF STATE FUNDING
MEGAN LESLIE†

ABSTRACT
This paper was developed as a result of the authorʼ’s involvement with
the Nova Scotia Rainbow Action Project in Halifax, Nova Scotia, who
are planning an action whereby a member of the group will submit a
complaint of discrimination to the provincial Human Rights Commission, contrary to the Nova Scotia Human Rights Act, on the ground of
sex.	

     The complaint will be based on a memberʼ’s denial of Nova Scotia Medical Services Insurance coverage for sex reassignment surgery,
which is prohibited in Nova Scotia. This paper outlines the players and
decision-making involved in determining whether or not sex reassignment surgery is funded by the state and discusses feminist theories of
gender that make problematic the need for sex reassignment surgery,
speciﬁcally the social construction, authenticity and transgression of
gender. The author also considers both the medical diagnosis of Gender Identity Disorder and the problems with sex reassignment surgery
as a treatment for this disorder. In conclusion, through a feminist ethics
analysis of the different arguments for and against sex reassignment
surgery, the author concludes that there is a need for the surgery to
be state-funded, but that deconstructing the two-gender system could
eliminate this need in the future.

†

The author is a third year student at Dalhousie Law School and a founding member of the
Social Activist Law Student Association (SALSA).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Nova Scotia Rainbow Action Project (NSRAP) is a group in Halifax,
Nova Scotia, that acts as a voice for gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered Nova Scotians.1 In the spring of 2004, NSRAP intends to submit
a complaint to the Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission of discrimination on the grounds of sex, contrary to paragraph 5(1)(a) of the Nova
Scotia Human Rights Act.	

    2 The complaint will be based on a denial of
Nova Scotia Medical Services Insurance (MSI) coverage for sex reassignment surgery (SRC) to a member of NSRAP. The Nova Scotia Physicianʼ’s Manual, a document that itemizes procedures insured by MSI,
speciﬁcally prohibits SRC.3
The complaint by NSRAP is a deliberate tactic to use the law as a tool
for social change. If the denial of SRC is found to be discrimination on
the basis of sex, MSI could be ordered to cease applying the policy in the
Physicianʼ’s Manual, and transsexuals in Nova Scotia would be given
access to treatment and surgery to bring their physical gender in line
with their psychological gender.
In this paper I outline the players and decision-making involved in
determining whether or not sex reassignment surgery is funded by the
state. I then discuss feminist theories of gender that problematize the
need for sex reassignment surgery, speciﬁcally the social construction
of gender, performativity of gender, authenticity of gender and transgression of gender. I also consider both the medical diagnosis of Gender
Identity Disorder and the problems with SRC as a treatment for this disorder. Finally, through a feminist ethics analysis of the different arguments for and against sex reassignment surgery, I conclude that while
the experience of transsexuals proves there is a need for state-funded
1

It is generally accepted that transgender is an umbrella term that includes any gender variant,
such as drag kings and queens, transvestites and transsexuals. Transsexuals are people who believe they are the opposite gender that would traditionally be linked to their birth sex, and seek
to become that sex by hormonal therapy or sex reassignment surgery to realign their physical
body with their mental gender. I will refer to male to female transsexuals as transsexual women,
and female to male transsexuals as transsexual men. A personʼ’s sex (i.e. genetic makeup, being
different from gender), their self awareness and behaviour experienced and labeled as male or
female. Sex and gender are again different from sexual orientation, which is the gender preference of oneʼ’s sexual attraction.
2
R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 214, s. 5(1).
3
Nova Scotia Medical Services Insurance, Physicianʼ’s Manual, looseleaf (Halifax, N.S.: s.n.,
197?–) [the Manual].

GIRLS WILL BE BOYS . . . 241

today, we need to work to eliminate the two-gender system which
will ultimately reduce, if not eliminate, the need for SRC in the future.
SRC

II. INSURED SEX REASSIGNMENT SURGERY EXPLAINED
1. The Legislators
While health care falls under provincial jurisdiction pursuant to section
92 of the Constitution,4 health care resource allocation involves both the
federal and provincial governments. The Canada Health Act5 establishes the criteria and conditions that must be met by the provinces before
receiving payment for health services from the federal government.6
The Act lists a set of criteria the provinces must meet in order to
receive a full cash contribution, and speciﬁcally requires that provinces
fund all insured services provided by hospitals and medical practitioners.7 The Act deﬁnes “hospital services” as:
…any of the following services provided to in-patients or outpatients at a hospital, if the services are medically necessary for the
purpose of maintaining health, preventing disease or diagnosing or
treating an injury, illness or disability…8

The job of determining what is “medically necessary” is left to the provinces. Each province has set up a system whereby the provincial governments and medical associations negotiate the services to be included in
the schedule of fees that allows physicians to be paid for their work.9
The allocation of decision making to the provinces means insured health
services differ from province to province, and new procedures and treatments are added to the list of health services if and when a province
decides to do so.
Sex reassignment surgery is one service that has been added to the
list of insured services in some provinces but not in others. In Nova
4

Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5.
R.S.C. 1985, c. 6 [the Act].
6
Ibid. s. 3.
7
Ibid. s. 9.
8
Ibid. s. 2 [emphasis added].
5
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Scotia, some peripheral medical treatments involved in sex reassignment, like hormone treatment, are covered; however, surgery is explicitly deemed a non-insured procedure. SRC is an insured procedure only
in Manitoba, Alberta, Newfoundland, and Saskatchewan.
Medical necessity is vaguely deﬁned in the Physicianʼ’s Manual published by Nova Scotia Medical Services Insurance.10 The Manualʼ’s preamble deﬁnes medical necessity as “those services provided by a physician to a patient with the intent to diagnose or treat physical or mental
disease or dysfunction….” However, it goes on to state that services explicitly deemed non-insured remain uninsured “regardless of individual
judgments regarding their medical necessity.” This means that in Nova
Scotia an individual doctor has no right to determine that SRC is medically necessary for an individual patient.11
2. The Doctors
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV),
published by the American Psychiatric Association, is the accepted authority for the classiﬁcation and diagnosis of mental disorders in North
America.12 Gender Identity Disorder (GID) is listed as a mental disorder that manifests in two ways: Gender Identity Disorder in Children,
and Gender Identity Disorder in Adolescents or Adults (302.6 and
302.85).13

9

William Lahey, “Overview of the Canadian Health Care System” in Dental Law in Canada
[forthcoming in 2004].
10
Supra note 3.
11
Part 2.1 of the Manualʼ’s Preamble provides:
Medically necessary services may be deﬁned as those services provided by a physician to a
patient with the intent to diagnose or treat physical or mental disease or dysfunction, as well as
those services generally accepted as promoting health through prevention of disease or dysfunction.
The provision of a service listed in the Schedule of Beneﬁts does not ensure payment by Medical Services Insurance. Services provided in circumstances where they were not medically necessary are not insured. For the purpose of this Preamble, Medical services, which are explicitly
deemed to be non-insured under the Health Services and Insurance Act or its Regulations, remain uninsured regardless of individual judgments regarding their medical necessity.
12
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: American
Psychiatric Association, 1994) [DSM-IV].
13
Ibid. at 538.
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While the DSM-IV deﬁnes mental illness in North America, the
Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association is a professional organization dedicated to the understanding and treatment of
gender identity disorders. The Harry Benjamin Association produces
the Standards of Care for Gender Identity Disorders14 as a professional
consensus about the “psychiatric, psychological, medical, and surgical
management of gender identity disorders.”15 The Standards of Care are
guidelines that provide ﬂexible directions for the treatment of persons
with GID, and speciﬁcally require a diagnosis of GID using the DSM-IV
criteria before treatment for the disorder can begin. One of the treatments listed is sex reassignment surgery.16
If Gender Identity Disorder is a mental disorder according to the
DSM-IV, and SRC is one treatment for GID, then it stands to reason that
in some cases SRC would be medically necessary to treat this mental
disorder. Given the Nova Scotia government determines medical necessity based upon the physicianʼ’s intent to “diagnose or treat physical or
mental disease or dysfunction,” it should follow, barring any legislative
policy decisions, that sex reassignment surgery is a service that should
be insured. However, this is not the case. Because of the structure of the
system for health care resource allocation, “medically necessary” is actually equivalent to “insured” and has no independent meaning outside
of this legislative meaning.
3. The Policy Makers
Health care resource allocation is an important consideration to factor
into funding of SRC. In his analysis of the just use of health care resources (in this case, with respect to in vitro fertilization), Leonard J. Weber
14

Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association, Standards of Care for Gender
Identity Disorders, Sixth Version, February, 2001, online: The Harry Benjamin International
Gender Dysphoria Association, Inc. <http://www.hbigda.org/socv6.pdf> [Standards of Care].
15
Ibid. at 1.
16
The Standards of Care provide that: Sex Reassignment is Effective and Medically Indicated
in Severe GID. In persons diagnosed with transsexualism or profound GID, sex reassignment
surgery, along with hormone therapy and real life experience, is a treatment that has proven to
be effective. Such a therapeutic regimen, when prescribed or recommended by qualiﬁed practitioners, is medically indicated and medically necessary. Sex reassignment is not “experimental,”
“investigational,” “elective,” “cosmetic,” or optional in any meaningful sense. It constitutes
very effective and appropriate treatment for transsexualism or profound GID. Ibid. at 18.
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considers principles of just allocation. One of his suggestions is to establish principles to assist in the identiﬁcation of what priority a particular treatment should have in the allocation of health resources.17 Weber
lists ﬁve principles to help identify priority treatments. They are:
1.

Treatment that, if successful, provides a signiﬁcant beneﬁt
to the patient takes priority over treatment that, if successful,
provides only marginal beneﬁt.

2.

A treatment that can beneﬁt many persons generally takes
priority over a treatment that can beneﬁt only a few.

3.

A treatment that is less expensive generally takes priority over
a treatment that is more expensive.

4.

Allocation decisions should not be made on the basis of who
“merits” or “deserves” treatment.

5.	

     Special	

    consideration	

    should	

    be	

    given	

    to	

    prevent	

    a	

    major	

    negative	

    
impact	

    of	

    allocation	

    decisions	

    on	

    persons	

    with	

    disabilities	

    or	

    on	

    
those	

    who	

    are	

    the	

    least	

    powerful	

    members	

    of	

    society.18

If we consider Weberʼ’s priority principles as they impact resource allocation arguments for SRC, there is a fairly straightforward argument for
insured surgery. First, SRC provides a signiﬁcant beneﬁt to the patient,
offering “lasting personal comfort with the gendered self (that maximizes) overall psychological well-being and self-fulﬁllment.”19 Transsexual
activists have noted that without treatment options many transsexuals
commit suicide, are murdered, or receive inadequate medical care as
a result of their transsexualism: the preservation of life is inarguably a
signiﬁcant beneﬁt to a transsexual patient.20 Second, transsexuals as a
group are marginalized, and among the least powerful in Canadian society; special priority must be given to the treatments of Gender Identity
Disorder. Surgery can be a medically necessary treatment for GID, and it
is just to allocate health care resources to sex reassignment surgery.
17

Leonard J. Weber, “In Vitro Fertilization and the Just Use of Health Care Resources” in James
M. Humber & Robert F. Almeder, eds., Reproduction, Technology and Rights (Totowa, N.J.:
Humana Press, 1996) at 82.
18
Ibid. at 82-83.
19
Standards of Care, supra note 14 at 1.
20
See e.g. “Remembering Our Dead,” online: GenderOrg Homepage <http://www.gender.org/
remember/>.
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4. The Judges
In 2003, the Federal Court of Canada dealt with the issue of essential
health care and sex reassignment surgery in the context of a male to
female transsexual serving a life sentence for murder.21 A transsexual
woman initiated a complaint with the Canadian Human Rights Commission alleging discrimination on the basis of sex and disability. Her
complaint was made against the Correctional Service of Canadaʼ’s (CSC)
policies regarding transsexual inmates, namely CSCʼ’s policy on placement of pre-operative transsexual inmates and their prohibition of sex
reassignment surgery for incarcerated individuals. With regard to the
prohibition on surgery, CSCʼ’s policy at the time was that sex reassignment surgery was not to be considered during the inmateʼ’s incarceration.22
The Corrections and Conditional Release Act23 mandates that every
inmate must be provided with essential health care. The deﬁnition of
essential health care in section 87(1) of CSCʼ’s policies is:
Inmates shall have access to screening referral and treatment services.
Essential services shall include […] mental health care provided in
response to disturbances of thought, mood, perception, orientation
or memory that signiﬁcantly impairs judgement, behaviour, the
capacity to recognize reality or the ability to meet the ordinary
demands of life. This includes the provision of both acute and longterm mental health care services…24

The Human Rights Tribunal found that for some people sex reassignment surgery constituted a legitimate, medically recognized treatment
for transsexualism. Further, the Tribunal found that in some cases SRC
could be essential. On judicial review, Layden-Stevenson J. agreed with
the Tribunal and found that SRC could be an essential health service. She
wrote:
Essential health care, pursuant to CCRA (subsection 86(1)), is
provided to inmates. The provision is mandatory. If sex reassignment
surgery is determined to be essential, subsection 86(1) applies.
21
Canada (Attorney General) v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission), 2003 FCT 89,
[2003] F.C.J. No. 117 (QL: FCJ) [AG v. CHRC].
22
Ibid. at para. 3.
23
S.C. 1992, c. 20.
24
AG v. CHRC, supra note 21 at para. 8.
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[...] I do not take issue with the conclusion that the role of the
court is limited when reviewing policy-based determinations by
ofﬁcials who are accountable for public funds. However, the right
of government to allocate resources as it sees ﬁt is not unlimited.
“It must be exercised according to law. The governmentʼ’s right to
allocate resources cannot override a statute such as the Canadian
Human Rights Act”…	

    25

Not only did Layden-Stevenson J. ﬁnd that SRC was an essential health
service, but she also found that Correctional Services Canada was required to pay for the surgery. She relied on the Harry Benjamin Standards of Care assertion that sex reassignment surgery can be medically
necessary as well as expert evidence that untreated transsexualism can
lead to individuals suffering from disabling torment.26 In light of this
decision, the answer to the question of whether or not MSI should fund
sex assignment surgery seems to be a straightforward “yes.”

III. THE GENDER PROBLEM
In their groundbreaking 1978 book Gender: An Ethnomedical Approach,
anthropologists Suzanne Kessler and Wendy McKenna introduced the
concept of looking at gender as a social construct.27 Kessler and McKenna argue that gender identity refers to an individualʼ’s own feelings
about whether he or she is a man or woman (girl or boy), and that gender
identity is a self-attribution of gender. They point out that:
…by what criteria a person might classify someone as being either
male or female, the answers appear to be so self-evident as to make the
question trivial. But consider a list of items that differentiate females
from males. There are none that always and without exception are
true of only one gender. No behavioural characteristic (e.g., crying
or physical aggression) is always present or never present for one
gender. Neither can physical characteristics—either visible (e.g.,
beards), unexposed (e.g., genitals), or normally unexamined (e.g.,
gonads)—always differentiate the genders.28
25

Ibid. paras. 51-52.
Ibid. para. 41.
27
Suzanne J. Kessler & Wendy McKenna, Gender: An Ethnomedical Approach (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1978) [Gender].
28
Ibid. at 8.
26
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Kessler and McKenna speak of “gender attribution” as the moment
when we decide someone is male or female.29 When we are born we are
attributed gender when the doctor looks at our genitals; save for cases
of ambiguous genitalia,30 this is a fairly simple process.
However, Kessler and McKenna question the rigid and dichotomous
nature of gender attribution, and highlight the fact that ambiguous cases
bring to light the value society ascribes to the bipartite gender attribution process.31 They go on to consider the gender attribution process
throughout oneʼ’s life, and argue that people make gender attributions—
decisions about whether someone is male or female— every time they
meet someone new. When we subconsciously look for signs of breasts
to identify women (although not all women have noticeable breasts and
not all men lack breasts), signs of a beard to identify men (although not
all men have a noticeable beard and not all women lack beards), and a
whole range of other gender signiﬁers, we are simply “determining,” for
the moment, whether a person is either male or female. But more than
just a sweeping inspection to determine gender, Kessler and McKenna
argue that “…gender attribution forms the foundation for understanding other components of gender, such as gender role (behaving like a
female or male) and gender identity (feeling like a female or male).”32
If gender is socially constructed, it should follow that one could
learn and adopt social signiﬁers of the opposite sex (e.g. “masculine”
dress or “feminine” hand gestures). Combined with the ability to medically alter oneʼ’s body to possess biological signiﬁers of the opposite sex
(e.g. “male” Adamʼ’s apple or “female” breasts), it becomes possible to
achieve a state of “being” the opposite gender. Sociologist Myra J. Hird
found that in the 1990ʼ’s a “distinct set of transsexual narratives began to
argue that if gender can be learned then ʻ‘womanhoodʼ’ (and ʻ‘manhoodʼ’)

29

Ibid. at 2.
In her book Hermaphrodites and the Medical Invention of Sex (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998) at 4, historian Alice Dreger discusses the history of hermpahrodism. She writes
that “some people—more than is generally assumed—are born with an anatomical conformation different from ʻ‘standardʼ’ male or female bodies. Their unusual anatomies can result in confusion and disagreement about whether they should be considered female or male or something
else. These people have for centuries been labeled as ʻ‘hermaphroditesʼ’…”
31
Gender, supra note 27 at 3.
32
Gender, supra note 27 at 2 [emphasis in original].
30
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is available to anyone with the capacity to learn.”33 Thus, transsexualism provides us with evidence that gender is an expression of sex using
signiﬁers which have been both created and approved by society.
Adding to Kessler and McKennaʼ’s concept that gender attribution
is the building block for understanding other components of gender is
Judith Butlerʼ’s notion of the performativity of gender.	

    34 Performativity
rests on the argument that gender is constructed, and that we will never
know our sex outside of our gender because we perform our gender
according to the acts, gestures, and desires that are the organizing principles of identity. At birth, weʼ’re assigned a gender according to that
sex. As we grow up we adopt social signiﬁers of gender. Women wear
makeup, men keep their hair and nails short, women sit with their legs
crossed and men undo their jackets when they sit down. There are a
myriad of social signiﬁers, from dress to mannerisms, which we perform
to display our sex, through gender, when our biological sex is covered.
Butler takes this idea one step further and asks what, if anything, is left
of “sex” once it has assumed its social character of gender? If gender is
socially constructed by what we assume of sex, then sex doesnʼ’t acquire
social meaning but instead is replaced by gender.35 Butler argues that
since gender is the social signiﬁer of sex, that sex is, in effect, gender.
This circular sex/gender theory is supported by Kessler and McKennaʼ’s earlier work. They write, “[T]he reality of gender is proved by the
genital which is attributed and at the same time the attributed genital
only has meaning through the socially shared construction of gender
attribution.”36 Hird refers to the signiﬁers we rely on to make gender
attributions as “cultural genitals.”37 Butler goes so far as to suggest that
all we have are “cultural genitals”: that if there is no access to “sex”
but through these signiﬁers then “sex” itself is something of a ﬁction or
fantasy.38
33

Myra J. Hird, “For a Sociology of Transsexualism” (August 2002) 36:3 Sociology 577 at 584
[Sociology].
34
Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge,
1990) at 136.
35
Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” (New York: Routledge,
1993) at 4 [Bodies That Matter].
36
Gender, supra note 27 at 8.
37
Sociology, supra note 33 at 588.
38
Sociology, supra note 33 at 5.

GIRLS WILL BE BOYS . . . 249

All these overlapping theories hinge on sex and gender as mutable
and socially constructed, but, more importantly, they call into question
the value of SRC. If “becoming” the opposite sex is achievable through
performance, then genital reconstruction through sex reassignment surgery should be unnecessary—arguably one could rely on constructing
“cultural genitals” to effect a successful sex reassignment.
But what if performativity is linked to biology and the body? Ethicist Janice Raymondʼ’s 1979 book The Transsexual Empire was one of
the ﬁrst books to challenge the medical/psychiatric concept of transsexualism and SRC as the cure, and instead questions the concept of gender itself.39 But Raymond still insists on genderʼ’s link to biology. She
repeatedly references the feminization of a man or the masculinization
of a woman when she discusses sex reassignment surgery and “becoming” the other sex. She agrees that masculinity and femininity are social
constructs and stereotypes of behaviour that are imagined in a particular
body, but argues these stereotypes, “…in the case of the transsexual,
have nothing to do with a male or female body. Thus the male-to-constructed-female goes from one stereotype to the other.”40 She points out
that SRC is a surgical construction to bring a personʼ’s body in line with
the stereotyped behaviour. Nonetheless, she distinguishes masculinity
and femininity from “male” and “female.” The former are socially and
surgically constructed; the latter are governed by biology and the vast
history surrounding that biology.41
Raymond does not see gender as immutable, but at the same time
she is unwilling to accept that a transsexual can change his or her sex.
While she does not believe that chromosomal sex deﬁnes gender, she
uses Kessler and McKenna as a jumping off point to argue that chromosomal sex shapes gender. She writes that in the case of women, female
biology has shaped female history, including:
…the history of menstruation, the history of pregnancy or the
capacity to become pregnant, the history of childbirth and abortion,
the history of certain bodily cycles and life changes, and the history
of female subordination in a male-dominant society.42
39

Janice Raymond, The Transsexual Empire: The Making of the She-Male (New York: Teacherʼ’s College Press, 1994) [Transsexual Empire].
40
Ibid. at 3.
41
Ibid. at 4.
42
Ibid. at 7.
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It is this link to biology that centres Raymondʼ’s arguments in the “authenticity” of gender. One writer on transsexualism notes:
There is hardly a more dramatic instance of contemporary professional
authority than so-called ʻ‘sex change surgery.ʼ’ Physicians perform
cosmetic surgery yet certify that their patients have undergone a
change in sex.43

However, most in the medical community do not view SRC as changing
a personʼ’s sex or gender,44 because society, which includes the medical community, assumes that sex exists as a measurable and immutable
trait. Raymond deconstructs that assumption and roots it in history and
experience, while at the same time coming to a similar conclusion about
sex and the authenticity of sex.
Raymond and Butler have incompatible views on the topic of “sex”.
Raymond roots part of how we imagine sex in biological and historical
realities, while Butler reasons that the performativity of gender replaces
sex and renders those realities obsolete categorizations. Nonetheless,
both leave us wondering about the priority of sex reassignment surgery.
If we accept that gender is performance, then there is no need to physically change oneʼ’s genitalia in order to “become” the other sex. Conversely, if Raymond is correct in her linkage of sex to biology, then
no amount of surgery will transform transsexuals into the other sex. In
fact, Raymond not only questions the value of SRC but argues against
it; she believes that SRC and transsexualism undercut the movement “to
eradicate sex-role stereotyping and oppression in this culture. Instead it
fosters institutional bases of sexism under the guise of therapy.”45
Looking back to Weberʼ’s principles of health resource allocation,
one must question the “signiﬁcant beneﬁt” achieved by SRC in light of
these theories. Is there a “signiﬁcant beneﬁt” if sex reassignment can
be achieved without surgery, or if sex reassignment can never happen,
even with surgery? Surely a successful surgery could maximize psychological well-being and self-fulﬁllment, but how can a beneﬁt be justiﬁed
43

Dwight D. Billings & Thomas Urban, “The Socio-Medical Construction of Transsexualism:
An Interpretation and Critique” in Blending Genders: Social Aspects of Cross-dressing and Sexchanging, Richard Ekins & Dave King, eds., (New York: Routledge, 1996) at 99 [Construction
of Transsexualism].
44
Sociology, supra note 33 at 582.
45
Transsexual Empire, supra note 39 at 5.
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when the treatment is comparable to a placebo? If these theories are correct, other treatments for Gender Identity Disorder need to be prioritized
over SRC—if SRC should be given a priority at all.
Another concept that complicates support of SRC is the proposition of gender transgression: “playing” with notions of gender with the
intended effect of rendering the two-gender system obsolete. The assumed characteristic of gender in our discussion thus far is that there are
only two sexes (male/female) and two genders (masculine/feminine).
Sex and gender are generally accepted as contemporaneous states. Both
male and female sexes are ordered by a set of stereotypes/signiﬁers that
are imagined as attributable to a particular body. Transsexuals render
these signiﬁers visible,46 offering us a chance to both question and play
with them. Butler considers drag, dressing in the clothing appropriate
for the opposite sex for the purpose of performing, to be one example
of the transgression of gender. Using Foucaultʼ’s language of power and
resistance, she writes that sometimes:
…the transferability of a gender ideal or gender norm calls into
question the abjecting power that it sustains. For an occupation or
reterritorialization of a term that has been used to abject a population
can become the site of resistance, the possibility of an enabling
social and political resigniﬁcation.47

Similarly, transsexual Kate Borenstein argues that transsexuals arenʼ’t
men or women, not because they are “inauthentic,” but because transsexuals, by their very existence, radically deconstruct sex and gender.48
She believes that gender is not consensual:
Weʼ’re born: a doctor assigns us a gender. Itʼ’s documented by the
state, enforced by the legal profession, sanctiﬁed by the church, and
itʼ’s bought and sold by the media. We have no say in our gender—
weʼ’re not allowed to question it, play with it, work it out with our
friends, lovers or family.49

46

Sociology, supra note 33 at 586.
Bodies That Matter, supra note 35 at 230.
48
Kate Borenstein, Gender Outlaw: On Men, Women and the Rest of Us (New York: Routledge,
1994) [Gender Outlaw].
49
Ibid. at 123.
47
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Borenstein calls for people to question gender, to subvert it, deconstruct,
it and reconstruct it. Through the transgression of gender, the lines of
gender categories will blur and people will be free to construct their
own gender (or not), in the way that they see ﬁt. Being a drag king or
queen, a crossdresser, transgendered, butch or femme, a transvestite,
two-spirited, or gender variant in any other way pushes the boundaries
of societyʼ’s deﬁnition of male/masculine and female/feminine as much
as transsexuality. Transgression can be an important step in challenging
the two-gender system.
However, it is difﬁcult to argue that all forms of transsexualism are
subversive. Raymond identiﬁes a transgression as being hyper-conformity to sex-roles.50 It is hard to avoid the fact that hormones and surgery
reify hegemonic gender norms.51 Especially in the context of the Standard of Careʼ’s requirement of “passing,” transsexuals are expected to be
ultra-masculine or ultra-feminine, reproducing the extreme end of either
gender. Anticipating the ﬂaws in her argument for transgression, Butler
calls into question “…whether parodying the dominant norms is enough
to displace them; indeed, whether the denaturalization of gender cannot
be the very vehicle for a reconsolidation of hegemonic norms.”52
Sex reassignment surgery both conﬁrms and legitimizes sex and
gender norms. In fact, part of the reason that SRC has been supported
by mainstream medicine may be because it is an example of the binary
gender system prevailing even in the face of perversion, mental dysfunction, and sickness: despite the transsexualʼ’s illness, he or she simply
wants to become the other gender. Transsexualism is easy to understand, support and cure so long as the two-gender system is upheld. It is
when true gender variance is proposed, like introducing a third gender
category that transgression becomes more like the vehicle of liberation
it has been proposed to be.

50

Transsexual Empire, supra note 39 at 216.
Sociology, supra note 33 at 590.
52
Bodies That Matter, supra note 35 at 125.
51

GIRLS WILL BE BOYS . . . 253

IV. THE MEDICAL PROBLEM
Michel Foucault, in The History of Sexuality, describes the “medicalization of the sexually peculiar” as a nineteenth century phenomenon—one
which was both an effect and an instrument of the power of health and
pathology.53 This medicalization was focused on biological anatomy as
the centre of truth; the medical scientist was a discoverer of truth, and
through his scientiﬁc explorations he alone could solve the problems
that the peculiar posed. Hird argues that the history of transsexualism
is a history of pathology, and points out that the word “transsexual” itself is a psychological and medical classiﬁcation54—a speciﬁc situation
where the “truth” of anatomy did not match the “truth” in a patientʼ’s
mind.
While the history of transsexualism is a story that closely parallels,
and oftentimes overlaps with, the histories of homosexuality and hermaphrodism,55 transsexualism does have its own unique medical and
social history. There is evidence of hormone therapy given to male transsexuals to stimulate breast development as early as the 1920ʼ’s, but any
gender variant people who sought medical treatment were labelled as
“transvestites” and treated as isolated cases. The transsexual “emerged”
in the early 1950ʼ’s with the widely publicized operation on Christine
Jorgensen in Denmark and was soon followed by the coining of the term
“transsexual” by Dr. Harry Benjamin.56 Prior to this time, transsexualism had been dismissed as a perversion; with the operation on Christine Jorgensen, there emerged a medical “cure”. Sex change advocates
worked to legitimize surgical treatment by constructing theories about
transsexualism that stressed the non-psychopathic nature of the illness
and by rationalizing diagnostic and treatment strategies.57 Transsexualism was further medicalized and legitimized when it received the new
53
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name of “gender dysphoria” in the 1970ʼ’s, a term that moved away from
the person and toward the condition; thus the term named a disease that
was to be the property of the medical profession.58
In 1980, Gender Identity Disorder appeared in the third edition of
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, and it is still
included in the Manualʼ’s most recent fourth edition.59 The diagnostic
criteria for adults and adolescents are:
A. A strong and persistent cross-gender identiﬁcation (not merely a
desire for any perceived cultural advantages of being the other
sex). In adolescents and adults, the disturbance is manifested by
symptoms such as a stated desire to be the other sex, frequent
passing as the other sex, desire to live or be treated as the other
sex, or the conviction that he or she has the typical feelings and
reactions of the other sex.
B. Persistent discomfort with his or her sex or sense of
inappropriateness in the gender role of that sex. In adolescents
and adults, the disturbance is manifested by symptoms such as
preoccupation with getting rid of primary and secondary sex
characteristics (e.g., request for hormones, surgery, or other
procedures to physically alter sexual characteristics to simulate
the other sex) or belief that he or she was born the wrong sex.
C. The disturbance is not concurrent with a physical intersex
condition.
D. The disturbance causes clinically signiﬁcant distress or
impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of
functioning.60

Forms of illness are more than just biological disease; they are also
metaphors, and possess both moral and social meaning.61 If we consider
the social meaning of gender implicit in the DSM-IVʼ’s criteria for transsexuality, it is apparent that there are only two genders, and that both
genders are tangible, achievable things: gender is something you are,
58
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you can be, and that you can identify. For example, “frequent passing
as the other sex” relies on the transsexualʼ’s interpretation (or societyʼ’s
interpretation) of the characteristics of a particular sex; diagnosing the
disorder depends on the subjectʼ’s success at “passing”—success that
relies on the medical practitionerʼ’s interpretation of what it means to
be a man or woman, and whether or not the transsexualʼ’s performance
was good enough. According to the Manual, male and female characteristics are quantiﬁable, and although the speciﬁcs of what constitutes
“typical feelings and reactions of the other sex” arenʼ’t listed, it is clear
that they are expected to be both known and understood by patient and
doctor. Kessler and McKenna write about one doctor who used his own
sexual attraction to a patient as a gauge for determining the “validity”
of his patientʼ’s claim of transsexuality.62 In more recent writing, Dwight
Billings and Thomas Urban describe a doctorʼ’s evaluation methods to
include antagonizing his genetic male patients to the point where they
lash out and he could properly assess their behaviour: gays get aggressive, “girls” cry.63
Even if we disregard these extreme examples and dismiss them
as unfortunate worst-case scenarios, it is still clear that the diagnostic
criteria still rely on sex stereotyping and views gender strictly through
a medical lens. In the introduction to the section on GID, the DSM-IV
states, “Gender Identity Disorder can be distinguished from simple nonconformity to stereo-typical sex role behaviour by the extent and pervasiveness of the cross-gender wishes, interests and activities.”64 According to the DSM-IV, deviation from societyʼ’s biologically determined sex
roles is acceptable, so long as you donʼ’t go too far. The criteria also
focus on symptoms that the illness can manifest, namely, signiﬁcant
distress or impairment with regards to functioning in society.
Transgendered people do suffer distress and impairment in society
—from “intolerance, discrimination, violence, undeserved shame, and
denial of personal freedoms that ordinary men and women take for
granted.”65 The DSM-IV criteria for GID are so ambiguous and rely on
such negative and sexist stereotypes that the simple ﬁrst step of diag62
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nosis calls into question the ethics of any treatment available for GID
and begs the question: is the diagnosis even right? Leslie Lothstein, in
the American Journal of Psychiatry, found that clinicians who advocate
SRC as a legitimate treatment see it as a cure, and believe that psychotherapy is useless for patients with GID. Doctors who view SRC as an
illegitimate treatment point to the “…complex psychological, medical,
legal, bioethical and political issues that are neglected or bypassed by
sex reassignment surgery procedures. They argue that sex reassignment
surgery leads to mistreatment and mismanagement of the gender dysphoric patient.”66 Lothstein cites several studies where patients were satisﬁed with the procedure and there is evidence of positive life changes;67
however, Billings and Urban point out that patients can “ill afford to be
critical of such a profound alteration as genital amputation.”68
Once a person has been diagnosed with GID, the patient is a candidate for treatment. The Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria
Association produces clinical guidelines intended to provide “ﬂexible
directions for the treatment of persons with gender identity disorders.”69
The Standards of Care explain that after diagnosis of Gender Identity
Disorder, the therapeutic approach usually includes three phases:70 real
life experience in the desired role, hormones of the desired gender, and
surgery to change genitalia and other sex characteristics.71 The minimum eligibility requirements for genital surgeries apply to genetic men
and genetic women seeking surgery, and are:
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3.

12 months of successful continuous full time real-life
experience. Periods of returning to the original gender may
indicate ambivalence about proceeding and generally should
not be used to fulﬁll this criterion;

4.

If required by the mental health professional, regular
responsible participation in psychotherapy throughout the reallife experience at a frequency determined jointly by the patient
and the mental health professional. Psychotherapy per se is not
an absolute eligibility criterion for surgery;

5.

Demonstrable knowledge of the cost, required lengths of
hospitalizations, likely complications, and post surgical
rehabilitation requirements of various surgical approaches;

6.

Awareness of different competent surgeons.

Readiness Criteria
1.

Demonstrable progress in consolidating oneʼ’s gender identity;

2.

Demonstrable progress in dealing with work, family, and
interpersonal issues resulting in a signiﬁcantly better state of
mental health; this implies satisfactory control of problems
such as sociopathy, substance abuse, psychosis, suicidality, for
instance.72

The diagnostic criteria rely on assumptions that transsexuals are a homogeneous group, that the transsexual is sick and needs standardized care,
and that the transsexual suffers from an illness that subverts social and
cultural variables.73 In particular, the criterion of real-life experience,
like passing, is based on how sex roles are imagined in a society and
the behaviours attributed to either sex. The methods used to allow transsexuals to change from one gender to the other are rigid, prescribed, and
regularized,74 leaving little room for the challenges to or transgression
of gender that Butler and Borenstein propose.
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The diagnostic criteria combined with the Standards of Care lead
to what Billings and Urban describes as “the con.”75 Transsexuals often
know what it takes to pass, and will put that knowledge to good use.
In her study of male to female transsexual communities, Anne Bolin
describes a veritable underground network of information on how to
“pass”76—both the tests put to a person by their doctor (passing as a
“real” transsexual) and the tests put to a person by society (passing as a
“real” woman or man). She points out that the role of the psychiatrist is
that of gatekeeper, and that the gatekeeper has a certain expectation of
what it is to be male or female. In her study, she found that as a group,
male to female transsexuals are highly motivated to score as feminine.77
Medical and psychiatric communities rely on and reinforce sex-role
stereotypes and cultural expectations. Transsexuals know this expectation exists and instead of re-educating they choose to conform to those
expectations: a manʼ’s view of a “real” woman. Borenstein describes
how she had her genital surgery because of cultural pressure, and that
she didnʼ’t ﬁt in a male body so she must have belonged in a female
body.78 People who are vulnerable in our society cannot risk alienating
the people who hold the power; thus transsexuals are forced into medicineʼ’s culture of genital imperatives.

V. CONCLUSION
Medically, challenges to the validity of diagnosis and treatment of transsexuals problematize the “cure” of sex reassignment surgery to the point
that one wonders not only if SRC is ethical but is it safe? Socio-cultural
critiques of the societal norms upon which Gender Identity Disorder and
its treatment are based illustrate the harm being done both to transsexuals and other vulnerable people in society (particularly women) who
continue to be marginalized by patriarchal power structures that uphold
the two-gender system. A feminist approach to ethics calls on women
to resist and overcome their oppression under patriarchy;79 this is what
75
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Raymond is trying to achieve when she supports moralizing transsexualism out of existence.
The problem with these criticisms is twofold. First, arguing that SRC
is unethical undermines both the agony of and the choices made by
transsexuals. Transsexuals experience very real alienation, discomfort,
and dislike of the sex to which their bodies assign them. Similarly, transsexuals experience very real discrimination, intolerance, violence and
denial of personal choice and freedoms as a result of their gender and
gender identity. Deconstructing GID and SRC from this feminist viewpoint
further marginalizes transsexuals and removes their voice and their right
to choose. One marginalized group can not reserve the right to speak for
another; this simply recreates oppressive power structures in another
form. Perhaps the desire or need for SRC is socially constructed, but simply deconstructing the desire or need to conclude that SRC is “wrong”
delegitimizes the choices made by individuals. Bolin points out that
transsexuals are not participating in a feminist speech revolution—they
simply want to “pass.”80 Their needs or desires must be respected. It
is wrong to deny access to SRC based on the moral decision-making of
those people who already ﬁt into the two-gender system—even if those
people actually want out of it, and see SRC as one more obstacle to getting out.
The second problem is that feminist ethics should not only criticize
practices that oppress but also imagine “morally desirable” alternatives
to them and offer “morally justiﬁable” ways to resist them.81 Raymond
and Butlerʼ’s arguments do neither. Billings and Urban look to therapy
as one answer because transsexuals lack the language “to express the
disparate and diverse desires which lead them to body mutilation.”82
Therapy would allow people to step away from the “for” or “against”
arguments around SRC and allow patients to criticize society and struggle against the crippling effects of social institutions.83
While Billings and Urban present one alternative, their focus is still
on the transsexual as an object of social change. In supporting the characteristically male aspects of ethics like independence, autonomy and
80
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choice, we are subverting the feminine and feminist aspects of community, care, and trust. Sex reassignment surgery may not actually heal the
mind or body, but it serves a moral function:84 SRC allows transsexuals
to choose the treatment they require as needed and validates their experiences as gender variant. This aspect of SRC is compatible with and
can coexist with a feminist deconstruction of Gender Identity Disorder
and the need for SRC. A feminist approach can understand the authentic
experience of transsexuals today and, at the same time, look towards
the future and work to eliminate the two-gender system to allow for different choices for future people. Fitting with Weberʼ’s framework, this
certainly produces the most signiﬁcant beneﬁt for the most number of
people.
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